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Two decades ago China entered an era with rapid expansion of
transport infrastructure. In an ambitious plan on high-speed railway
development, China plans to have the longest high-speed railway
network by 2020. Social concerns and anxiety with the adverse
environmental and social risks and impacts of high-speed railways are
related to the lay-out, the construction and the daily operation of
high-speed trains. While anecdotal evidence of concerns and anxieties
of Chinese citizens on high-speed railway systems exist, systematic
assessment of concerns, anxieties, protests and support of Chinese
citizens regarding the planning, implementation and daily operation
of high-speed railways is absent. This study investigated high-speed
railway related public views, risk perceptions and trust of Chinese
residents living along the Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway. The
results show high public acceptance in high-speed railway, due to
perceived low environmental and social risk and high economic and
social beneﬁts. The current closed, government-dominated decision-
making, opaque information provisioning, and lack of communication
with and involvement of residents cause low levels of trust in railway-
related local governmental agencies and companies. The increasing
‘room for manoeuvre’ of China's civil society may increase information
disclosure and transparency, two-way risk communication and public
participation in future large infrastructure development.
& 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved..
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The construction of high-speed railways (HSRs, with 200 km/h) has become an important priority
for many countries. A decade ago China entered an era with high investments in and rapid expansion
of HSR transport infrastructure. State planning for China's HSR began in the early 1990s. The ﬁrst HSR
(Qinhuangdao–Shenyang) started to construct in 1999 and opened in 2003. In 2004, the State Council
approved Medium and Long-Term Railway Network Plan 2005–2020 and adjusted it in 2008. According
to the Plan, the government will build a grid of HSRs with four east-west lines and four north-south
lines, also named “four vertical and four horizontal corridors”. The Wenzhou bullet train accident on
23 July 2011 was the ﬁrst major HSR calamity, killing 40 and seriously injuring 200 people. It
spotlighted long-persisting safety fears among many Chinese experts, who called on the government
to slow down expansion plans. The Chinese HSR was designed for a maximum speed of 380 km/h in
commercial operation, but operational speed was reduced to 200–300 km/h after the Wenzhou train
collision. The accident and the prosecution for corruption of top railway ofﬁcials temporarily slowed
down the progress of the country's massive government-operated, funded, and built rail
infrastructure. However, by early 2012, the Chinese government renewed investments in high-
speed railway to rejuvenate the slowing economy. As of December 2013, China has the world's longest
HSR network with 11,000 km of rail in service. By the end of April, 2014, China railway sector raised its
2014 ﬁxed asset investment budget to RMB 800 billion (US$ 129 billion) and increased the number of
HSR projects from 44 to 64. According to the 12th Five-Year Plan on Railway Development 2011–2015
enacted in July 2011 by the Ministry of Railway (MoR),1 China is projected to have nearly 40,000 km of
operational high-speed railway by 2015 (Fig. 1).
Beijing–Shanghai HSR (Jinghu HSR in Chinese) was proposed in the early 1990s by the former MoR
and became one of the four north-south railway lines planned in the Medium and Long-Term Railway
Network Plan 2005–2020. In 1995, the track was included in the 9th Five Year Plan (1996–2000). The
MoR submitted an initial high-speed rail line design for state approval in June 1998 (Net Resources
International, 2011). After ﬁve years of intensive debate whether to use steel-on-steel rail track or
maglev technology, the construction plan was ﬁnalized in 2004 and feasibility study report was
approved in March 2006. The Beijing-Shanghai High-Speed Railway Corporation was established in
2007 as a responsible agency for project construction. The provincial and municipal governments
along the line were responsible for the land acquisition, people moving to new houses, and land
clearance within their respective jurisdictions. Construction of the Beijing-Shanghai HSR began on
April 18, 2008 and commercial train services started on June 30, 2011. Over 200 million passengers
took the Beijing-Shanghai HSR till April, 2014.
According to the MoR, construction included twice as much concrete as the Three Gorges dam, and
120 times the amount of steel used in the Beijing National Stadium. There are 244 bridges and 22
tunnels, and the route is constantly monitored by 321 seismic, 167 wind speed and 50 rainfall sensors
(Railway Gazette International, 2011). Total investment of the Beijing-Shanghai HSR was 217.6 billion
Yuan (US$ 32 billion), in line with other mega infrastructure projects such as the Three Gorges Dam
Project, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, the South-to-North Water Diversion Project, the West-to-East
Natural Gas Transmission Project and the West-to-East Power Transmission Project.
More recently and not unlike what happened in other countries, the environmental and health
consequences and impacts of China's HSR have moved to the fore in public and policy debates.
Researchers in China have reported on the environmental, ecological and health impacts of the high-
speed railway, as well as on its economic and social beneﬁts (Chen et al., 2010, 2007, 2014; Ding et al.,
2010; Jiang, 2010; Zhang, 2010). However, these studies mainly concerned scientiﬁc environmental
impact assessment of the HSR, but ignored public perceptions and evaluations of environmental and
health risks. Little is known of these risk perceptions by the public of HSR infrastructure, and the trust
of the public in government authorities and railway companies in coping with such risks which are
important for decision-making. This research ﬁlls the above gap by investigating Chinese residents1 March 2013 MoR was split: one part was amalgamated into Ministry of Transport, the other part became the new
National Railway Corporation.
Fig. 1. China's High-Speed Railway Construction Plan till 2015.
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the literature on the environmental concerns and anxieties of citizens on high-speed railway. Section
3 reviews the environmental policies and protests on high speed railways in China, to be followed by
an introduction to the research methodology in Section 4. Four subsequent sections report on the
public's view on HSR, its perceived risks and beneﬁts, information access and trust of the public, and
participation of and communication with the public in decision-making, respectively. The ﬁnal section
presents the conclusions.2. Environmental concerns and anxieties of high-speed railway
There is a vast international literature on the planning, implementation, and day-to-day operation of
high-speed railways, predominantly from a technological-engineering, a ﬁnancial-economic and/or a
time-delay perspective (Han et al., 2009; Albalate and Bel, 2012). However, ever since high-speed trains
have been planned and implemented (ﬁrst in Japan in the 1960s and France in the 1980s, later also in
Spain, Germany, Italy, UK, US, China, Korea and other countries) a part of the literature addressed the
environmental and social impacts that were believed to come along with the construction and
operation of these bullet trains. Although high speed in all modes of transport comes at a price of
negative environmental impact, many environmentalists, railway companies and their interest
organizations, as well as governmental agencies claim that high-speed railway is environmentally
friendly compared to road and air transport and can contribute to climate change mitigation.
Independent research, on the other hand, concludes that these beneﬁts may not be that large. Over the
last decade, many researchers have shown that high-speed railway can affect the surrounding soil, air
and water environment, the landscape and ecological system, energy efﬁciency, and human health,
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Kaczensky et al., 2003; Rozycki, 2003; Van Wee et al., 2003; Westin and Kåeson, 2012).
While overall and on a higher (national) aggregate level, high-speed trains have often (but not
always e.g. Spaven, 2006; Chen et al., 2014) been welcomed as environmentally friendly alternatives
for road and air transport systems. But locally, along the tracks of the high-speed railway, concerns
and protests have been strong in some countries. These environmental concerns, anxieties and
protests of (organized) citizens and residents have also been identiﬁed as major causes of delay and
overspending, following lengthy procedures and additional infrastructure requirements. Hence,
controversies on these large-scale public projects have often been interpreted in terms of general and
national interests versus speciﬁc and local interests (De Carlo, 2006). Local environmental concerns
and anxieties have been brought in relation to NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard), although that is not
always considered an adequate interpretation of such concerns (Owens, 2004; Lastrico, 2012).
Concerns and anxieties with adverse environmental and social risks and impacts of high-speed
railway are related to both the construction and (also geographical) lay-out of these infrastructural
systems, as well as the daily operation of high-speed trains. Citizen and local communities (incidentally
backed by local authorities) have protested against, among others: the intrusion by these high-speed
tracks of their local communities and identities (Della Porta and Piazza, 2007); signiﬁcant land-use
change and consequences for landscape and biodiversity; top-down planning and design by national
authorities with limited or no possibilities for participation and co-decision; and environmental and
human health consequences of the daily high-speed train operation, including noise, vibration, radiation
and electro-magnetic pollution, visual and air pollution, and accidents. Related to these concerns is the
likely devaluation of property, except for property near railway stations. In many countries a majority of
local citizens along a (planned) track protested against the planned high-speed railway, while a minority
considered the regional economic and social beneﬁts more important than these negative
environmental and social risks (Schaap, 1996; Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009; Fedi et al., 2012). Local
concerns and anxieties were often paralleled by distrust against (national) planners and decision-
makers, construction and railway companies, and even democratic representative institutions
(Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009; Lastrico, 2012). Concerns and distrust around high-speed railway
plans turned into widespread and massive protests against such infrastructural protests when public
opinion was supportive, residents had a strong attachment to their local places, and local community
along the track became involved (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009).
Over the past decade governmental authorities in many countries have learned and partly
implemented lessons on how to cope, handle and partly prevent these concerns, protests and distrust
of local citizens and communities during the planning, implementation and operation of high-speed
railways. Hence, we have seen extensive information provisioning from multiple authorities and also
disinterested/independent parties and stakeholders; extensive public consultations (De Carlo, 2006;
Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009); systematic and institutionalized involvement of citizens, commu-
nities and NGOs in different phases of high-speed railway project planning and implementation;
growing experiences with and institutionalisation of environmental dispute resolution; and the
development of alternative trajectories and costly adaptations of plans e.g. in the form of tunnels,
noise screens and compensation funds. These adaptations have all contributed to less (and less
violent) citizen conﬂicts, protests and concerns on high-speed railway systems. Dorf and Sabel (1998)
labeled the various attempts to further involve and engage local citizens beyond the formal
representative institutions democratic experimentalism. The French Mediterranean high-speed
railway is often cited as a best-practice model in democratic experimentalism, trying out consultative
and participatory decision-making (Leheis, 2012; De Carlo, 2006). But also in other European
countries consultation, participation, and dispute resolution have increasingly been institutionalized
in laws, regulations and policy-making practices. It was not that public concerns, anxieties and
protests on high-speed railways and other larger infrastructural project have disappeared in liberal
democracies, as examples in South Korea (Han et al., 2009), Germany (Novy and Peters, 2013) and the
UK (the recent protest on the HS2 from London to West Midlands) showed. But these concerns,
anxieties and protest have certainly been contained, partly addressed and overall diminished through
institutionalized forms of public engagement and participation. Such institutional innovations have
also increased the legitimacy of national governments in planning and implementing high-speed
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among local environmental groups, citizens and even local government ofﬁcials against national
governments and national railway companies; while national NGOs cooperated more smoothly with
these national authorities and companies (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009; Della Porta and Andretta,
2002; De Carlo, 2006).3. Environmental policies and protests on HSR in China
Over the last 20 years, China's government has established a legal system for the environmental
management of HSR development and construction. At the plan and construction stages of HSR,
“Three Simultaneous” principle (the main project and pollution control facilities have to be designed,
constructed and put into use synchronously) and environmental impact assessment (EIA) are
prerequisites, according to the 1998 Regulations on the Administration of Construction Project
Environmental Protection and the 2003 EIA Law. Following the EIA Law, the Ministry of Environmental
Protection (MEP) identiﬁed the railway sector as one of the pilot sectors, which was included in The
11th Five-Year Plan on Railway (2006–2010). Since 1995, the MoR developed a series of environmental
protection regulations, guidelines and standards and the Ministry of Transport enacted Measures for
the Administration of Environmental Protection of Transport Construction Projects in 2003. In 2007, the
MoR also issued a “Six in One” policy, of which environmental protection was one of the six objectives
in implementing HSR.
At a practical level, environmental protection measures have been integrated into HSR planning
and construction, including rail network planning, pre-feasibility study, feasibility study, preliminary
design, construction and operation. However, many challenges emerged. Environmental noncom-
pliance of HSR projects occurs every now and then, and caused public protests and governmental
reactions (Yan andWang, 2012). For instance, between 2010 and 2012 the MEP ordered the temporary
suspension of construction and operation of 13 high-speed lines that failed to pass environmental
requirements (Liang, 2012; The Beijing News, 2011). Problems included inappropriate siting, noise
nuisance, radiation effects, non-updated EIA reports, absence of compulsory public participation in
EIA, and ecological impacts on the giant panda protection zone (Liang, 2012). The MEP also issued the
Notice on the Changing EIA of Railway Construction Projects in January 2012, which speciﬁed that a
second EIA was necessary in case a rail project included major changes in six categories.
Evidence exists of emerging concerns and anxieties of Chinese citizens on high-speed railway
systems. In 2008, Shanghai citizens protested against a planned track from Shanghai to south of
Hangzhou. In December 2009 Chengdu citizens opposed the planned Chengdu-Chongqing HSR
because of noise pollution and electromagnetic effects. A public survey showed that 99.8% of the local
citizens objected to the planned route (Lu, 2010). Finally, the construction scheme was adjusted and
the construction started in October 2010. The planning of the Beijing-Shenyang HSR project also
encountered ﬁerce public debate and objections, especially on noise and safety. Since 2009, tens
of thousands of Beijing residents conducted four massive protests that delayed HSR construction.
In December 2012, for instance, around 300 protesting citizens criticized a fraudulent EIA report
posted online2 and called on authorities to change the proposed route. Some scholars have identiﬁed
major challenges for Chinese authorities to disclose information, to organize public participation, and
to mitigate social and environmental impacts of HSR (Wang et al., 2012). The emerging public protests
against large infrastructural projects resulted in the promulgation of Interim Measures on the Social
Stability Risk Assessment of Major Fixed Assets Investment Projects by National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC) in August 2012. The NDRC classiﬁed all projects as having high, medium, or low
risk levels, and only low risk projects could receive approval of NDRC.
Concerns, anxieties and protests of Chinese citizens regarding the planning, implementation
and daily operation of high-speed railways have hardly been studied systematically. A number of2 The environmental impact assessment report posted online in November 2012 suggested that 94% of the Beijing residents
were in favor of the HSR in July survey.
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on the other hand makes that the results of Western studies on HSR protests and citizen concerns (as
cited above) cannot automatically be considered valid for China. First, China is only just starting to
experiment with consultation, participation and wide-spread two-way information provision on the
environmentally relevant infrastructural projects (Zhong and Mol, 2008; Zhao, 2010; Kostka and Mol,
2013). Hence, the often criticised DAD (Decide-Announcement-Defend) approach to infrastructure
policy making still prevails in China. Second, in China room for releasing concerns, anxieties and
complaints in (old and new) media and for individual and collective protests is expanding over the
last decade, but still of a different magnitude compared to western democracies (Wu, 2013; Johnson,
2013; He et al., 2014b). Third, while in all countries national state agencies play a major role in
planning and implementing (but less in operating) high-speed rail systems, in China the role of
market parties and local authorities is much smaller compared to European and North American
countries. This all has potentially consequences for the credibility and trust relations of citizens
around the planning and construction of major infrastructures by state authorities (He et al., 2013).
And ﬁnally, environmental and health concerns have only recently emerged high on the public and
political agendas (He et al., 2012a, 2012b; Xiao et al., 2012).4. Study area and data collection
We investigated public concerns and trust on China's HSRs through a case study on the Beijing-
Shanghai HSR because it was a ﬁrst long HSR that crossed the developed eastern area and had some
citizens opposed its construction. In connecting two major economic zones – the Bohai Economic Rim
and the Yangtze River Delta – this track passes through four provinces and three municipalities
(Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shandong, Anhui, Jiangsu and Shanghai) and crosses the Yangtze River and
Huanghe River. One quarter of the country's population lives along the railway, with a total length of
1318 km. The environmental investment in track construction was 7.69 billion Yuan, accounting for
3.53% of the total investment budget. Reducing the project's short- and long-term eco-environmental
consequences have been pivotal elements in the planning, construction and operational phases.
Alternative routes were selected in order to protect four historical and cultural heritage sites in Anhui,
Jiangsu, and Hebei provinces. Bridges and tunnels were constructed where the HSR passed three
scenic areas in Jiangsu and Anhui provinces and engineering measures were taken to protect
vegetation and biodiversity. Sound barriers were set up along 326 km for noise reduction.
Problems occurred regardless of these preventive measures. Before construction started, many
Shanghai citizens resisted this HSR. In total 9769 Shanghai households within 30 m on both sides of
the HSR were moved to new places to avoid major health impacts. During construction, audit reports
of the Chinese National Audit Ofﬁce on Beijing-Shanghai HSR disclosed non-compliance and failure to
implement environmental laws and regulations from 2009 to 2011. In June 2012, MEP disclosed
environmental monitoring and investigation results of Beijing-Shanghai HSR project, according to
Notice on Implementing Public Notiﬁcation of Final Environmental Protection Acceptance of Completed
Construction Projects 2003. The noise levels caused by high-speed trains exceeded the national
standard in 129 out of 1001 sensitive places of the Beijing-Shanghai HSR (MEP, 2012).
In order to study public attitudes towards environmental risk of this HSR, a stratiﬁed sampling
strategy was adopted for selecting the cities/prefectures. Tianjin Municipality, Suzhou prefecture
(Jiangsu Province), and Zaozhuang prefecture (Shandong Province) were selected as investigation
sites from a total of 24 cities along the Beijing-Shanghai HSR (Fig. 2). The criteria for selecting these
municipalities/prefectures were diversity in size (including a megacity of 15 million, a large city of six
million and a medium-sized prefecture of 3 million inhabitants), economic level (high in the ﬁrst two
prefectures and medium in the last one; but of course compared to overall China all relatively high),
and location along the Beijing-Shanghai HSR (north, south, and middle). Two methods for data
collection were employed: a series of in-depth interviews with ofﬁcials of local governments, local
Environmental Protection Bureaus (EPBs), and Transportation Bureaus were held; and a survey among
900 residents along the Beijing-Shanghai HSR was executed. Interviewed ofﬁcials participating in the
HSR project coordination were purposefully (rather than randomly) selected with the assistance of
Fig. 2. Three surveyed places along Beijing-Shanghai high-speed railway in China.
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involvement in HSR planning, construction and/or operation. In each of the three cities, an equal
number of residents were selected through stratiﬁed random sampling, ensuring variety in distinct
communities, economic situation, and distance to the HSR. The surveyed residents accounted for
0.01%, 0.02%, and 0.7% of the total population (2012) living along the track in the three districts of
Tianjin, Suzhou, and Zaozhuang, respectively. As we present pooled results of the three
neighborhoods (and not weighted averages), there is a small bias towards less well-educated and
poorer households.
All interviewed ofﬁcials and surveyed residents were told that information would be made
anonymous and only used by the researchers. Semi-structured interviews were executed face-to-face
by the ﬁrst author, recorded through ﬁeld notes and transcribed. Interview topics were developed in
relation to the main research questions, including the viewpoints on HSR construction and operation,
perceived environmental and ecological risks, environmental measures and management practices,
information disclosure and communication between citizens and HSR public and private organiza-
tions. The survey questionnaire on HSR risk perceptions and trust consisted of ﬁve sections: (1) socio-
demographic characteristics of the interviewees; (2) public experiences and perceptions with high-
speed railway; (3) risks and beneﬁts of high-speed railway; (4) information access and public trust in
HSR stakeholders; (5) decision-making, public participation and communication. The draft
questionnaire design was discussed with ﬁve researchers from our institutes and from two local
universities, and an adapted version was pre-tested among 20 residents nearby the Beijing-Shanghai
HSR in Zaozhuang prefecture in August, 2012, and further adapted. The ﬁnal revised questionnaire
was used by 10 trained interviewers in a face-to-face survey in September and October 2012. A total of
828 valid resident questionnaires were returned (response rate 92%); 288 came from Tianjin
Municipality, 271 from Zaozhuang, and 269 from Suzhou. Table 1 provides the background of the
pooled respondents. SPSS was used for statistical analysis of the survey data.5. Preference and views on high-speed railway
In line with earlier research (Chen et al., 2014), the high-speed railway is seen as a preferable mode
of medium (about 1000 km and less than 5 h traveling) distance transport in China. Almost 60% of the
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Fig. 3. Respondent preference for long distance transport modes (N¼828).
Table 1
Social and demographic background of respondents in Tianjin, Suzhou, and Zaozhuang (n¼828).
Items Sub-group Percent (%) Items Sub-group Percent (%)
Place Tianjin 35 Occupation Teacher, researcher 19
Suzhou 32 Governmental staff 18
Zaozhuang 33 Businessman 17
Age Less than 30 37 Farmer 7
31–50 54 Worker 18
More than 50 9 Students 13
Gender Male 56 Retirement 4
Female 44 Other 3
Party member Yes 26 Income per month (Yuan) Less 2000 26
No 74 2001–4,000 44
Education Middle school and below 14 4001–6,000 16
High middle school 36 6001–8,000 6
College and university 46 8001–10,000 3
Master and above 4 More than 10,000 5
G. He et al. / Environmental Development 14 (2015) 37–5244respondents have taken the high-speed railway at least one time during the last two years, and see the
high-speed railway as their ﬁrst choice for travels over medium distance. Over 63% of the respondents
preferred high-speed railway to other transport modes, such as conventional train, bus, airplane and
ship. Only about 7% of the respondents indicated not to choose high-speed railway (Fig. 3). Time
saving, comfort, and convenience determined the HSR preference, while high prices and long
distances to HSR stations negatively affected HSR preferences. Chi-square tests indicated that males
(χ2¼16.029, po0.001), younger respondents (χ2¼47.628, po0.000), civil servants (χ2¼81.758,
po0.000), respondents with higher incomes (χ2¼44.767, po0.002), respondents with previous HSR
experience (χ2¼76.891, po0.000), and respondents from large cities (χ2¼21.547, po0.001)
preferred high-speed railway to females, older citizens, private sector respondents, lower income
residents, respondents without previous HSR experience, and citizens from small towns and villages.
No statistically signiﬁcant differences were found with respect to education and party memberships.
The interviewed local ofﬁcials expressed positive and supportive attitudes towards the
construction of the HSR in their jurisdictions. About 38% of the residents supported the construction
of HSR nearby their home, 12% opposed it and around 50% were ambivalent. Spearman correlation
analysis showed that attitudes towards the construction of high-speed railway were more positive
among highly educated (po0.05), high income residents (po0.05), those with HSR experience
(po0.001), those living in large cities (po0.05) and far away from high-speed lines (po0.01). Sex,
age, and party membership had no differences on attitudes towards the construction of high-speed
railways in China. In terms of the distance to the HSR, over 90% of the respondents thought it safe to
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Fig. 4. Respondents' concern about the ecological and environmental impacts of high-speed railway construction and
operation (N¼828).
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The majority of respondents felt that the local environment deteriorated compared to three decades
ago, in terms of serious environmental pollution (54%), damaged natural landscape (16%), and more
and more man-made buildings (11%) due to fast urbanization and industrialisation. The area along the
Beijing-Shanghai HSR has industrially developed and became densely populated over the years. Still,
after the HSR construction and putting into operation, nearly 39% of the respondents considered that
the local environmental quality improved, and only 13% thought it deteriorated. Others did not
perceive any changes. About 19% of the respondents still felt they lived in an area with beautiful
natural scenery.
Surveys and studies in other countries have reported widespread concerns about the
environmental and ecological impacts at construction and operation stages of the HSR (Chester and
Horvath, 2010, 2012; De Santo and Smith, 1993; Givoni, 2006; Kaczensky et al., 2003; Rozycki, 2003;
Westin and Kåeson, 2012). The data in the current survey showed similar concerns. Respondents were
asked to indicate their concerns about 14 environmental and ecological issues related to high-speed
railway construction and operation (Fig. 4). Accidents, land occupation and noise disturbance were of
the highest concerns to respondents. The 2011 Wenzhou crash accident, the ﬁrst of its kind in China,
may have had a profound impact on public conﬁdence and concern with high-speed railway in our
study, leading especially to major concerns regarding accidents. In general, there were relatively high
levels of concern for environmental pollution compared to ecological impacts such as deteriorating
natural reserves, landscape damage or cultural heritage destruction (Fig. 4). Hence, Chinese citizens
were more concerned about environmental impacts during operation of the services, and less about
those related to the construction phase. This contrasted environmental concerns around HSR found in
western countries, using similar questions (e.g. Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009).6. Comparing perceived risks and beneﬁts of high-speed railway
Perceived high-speed railway construction and operational risks were compared with other large
infrastructure projects (Fig. 5). The results showed that nuclear power, new weapon systems, and
large chemical plants were perceived by most respondents as high risk projects (65%, 62%, and 60%,
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Fig. 5. Public perceived risks of the different infrastructures (N¼828).
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resources exploitation and transportation projects (oil, gas, hydro, electricity). In general, all mobility
projects had relatively low levels of perceived risks, including high-speed railway. These ﬁndings were
congruent with other studies, which found major public concerns on nuclear and chemical risks in
China (He et al., 2011, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Zhang et al., 2013) as well as in for instance the UK
(Poortinga and Pidgeon, 2003; Pidgeon, et al., 2008).
Public acceptability of hazardous technologies depends, among other things, upon people's
perceptions of both risks and beneﬁts, and the balance between them. The in-depth interviews with
local government ofﬁcials, local EPBs and local transportation bureaus converged in the beneﬁts of
HSR far outweighing its (environmental and social) risks, which was in line with the formal position of
the government. In general, the local residents underlined these views. More respondents thought
beneﬁts of high-speed rail far outweighed (35%) or slightly outweighed (26%) risks, compared to those
who found its risks far outweighed (9%) or slightly outweighed (10%) any beneﬁts. Respondents
especially valued the social beneﬁts (51%), followed by economic beneﬁts (32%) and environmental
beneﬁts (17%). The perceived main economic beneﬁts included logistics and transportation costs;
regional economic development; facilitating the high-tech industry, construction and export
business; boosting tourism and service industries; and real estate market development. Social
beneﬁts related to saving time, accelerating new urbanization, meeting needs of mobile people,
changing lifestyles of residents, increasing employment, and raising the national pride of the public.
The key environmental beneﬁts were energy saving, air pollution reduction, and climate change
mitigation. The results contrasted a survey in Susa Valley, Italy, where 66% of the interviewed
residents saw very little to no (environmental and social) beneﬁts that could justify the HSR project,
and 56% of them feared that HSR construction would bring negative environmental impacts to the
valley and harmful health consequences to its residents (Marincioni and Appiotti, 2009). Most Chinese
G. He et al. / Environmental Development 14 (2015) 37–52 47citizens thought the central government would beneﬁt most from the HSR (19.5%), followed by
construction and operation companies (19%), the local governments (18%), local residents (17%), future
generations of politicians (10%), businessmen (9%), and foreign companies (7%).7. Public trust in the information sources and related stakeholders
For information on environmental and social risks of HSR, the Chinese public relies especially on
the MoR (23%), national media (22%), the central government (13%) and companies (13%). Only for a
few respondents NGOs (2%), local media (3%), and research institutes & universities (4%) were relevant
information providers on HSR environmental risks (Fig. 6). The central government was considered
the most trustful source of information (29%), followed by the national media (16%), and research
institutes & universities (11%). Few considered relatives and friends (2%), NGOs (2%) and local media
(5%) a trustworthy information source (Fig. 6). This high trust in governance information is
remarkable, and contrasts similar studies on HSR in other (western) countries; but is in accordance
with our studies on nuclear power risks and on rural chemical risks in China, using a similar
questionnaire (He et al., 2013, 2014b). Spearman correlation analysis showed that older people
(po0.001), respondents with less education (po0.05), low income (po0.001), and living in small
towns and villages (po0.001) relied more on central government and national media information on
environmental risks of high-speed railways; but no signiﬁcant differences existed regarding gender,
career, party membership, and distance to the high-speed railway. Respondents with less education
(po0.01), a governmental profession (po0.05), low income (po0.05), being a party member
(po0.05), living in small towns and villages (po0.01) and far away from the high-speed railway
(po0.05) had more trust in environmental risks information from the central government and
national media; but no signiﬁcant differences existed regarding gender and age.
Respondents were especially critical on the reliability of the disclosed information on the
environmental impacts of HSR, while they judged the accessibility more favorably (Fig. 7). Most
respondents thought that information access seriously affected (33%) and affected (59%) public
opinion on the high-speed railway.
Trust is a desirable Chinese traditional cultural value. Compared with Western societies such as the
United States, Chinese societies are low-trust societies. Furthermore, there was also a consistent lack
of institutional trust in China (He et al., 2012a). In investigating trust we employed a three-point scale
– high, average, and low (here we only used “high” category) – on four facets of trust: belief in the
good intent and concern of partners, belief in their competence and capabilities, belief in their0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
Central government
National media
Institutes & universities
MoR
Local governments
Companies
Local Media
NGOs 
Relatives & friends
% of respondents
Information source trusted
Information source used
Fig. 6. Information sources used and trusted on environmental risk of high-speed railway.
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Fig. 7. Information quality assessment on environmental risk of high-speed railway by the public.
G. He et al. / Environmental Development 14 (2015) 37–5248reliability, and belief in their perceived openness (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). For the Chinese public
along the HSR the central government was considered as the most trustful organization regarding all
four dimensions, followed by experts (with 56% of the respondents believing in their good intent and
concern; 62% considered them competent and capable; 69% found their reliability high; and 62%
perceived them open) (Fig. 8). Companies involved in railway construction and operation were
perceived as the least trustful organizations, especially regarding their reliability (29% of respondents
found them reliable) and perceived openness (28% considered the companies open). NGOs were
trusted with respect to their good intent and concerns, but less so regarding their competences and
capabilities (34%), and – surprisingly – perceived openness (31%). International organizations were
less trusted for their intent and concerns, and their competences and capabilities. These results were
largely consistent with previous research on trust with respect to nuclear power risk. Also the
governmental authorities were much more trusted than other organizations involved (He et al., 2013).8. Decision-making transparency and communication with public
The Beijing-Shanghai HSR was one of the key transport infrastructure projects in China's 11th Five-
Year Plan (2006–2010) for National Economic and Social Development and the Medium and Long-Term
Railway Network Plan 2005–2020. All interviewed ofﬁcials knew the former plan and heard of the
latter. They were aware of the involvement of the State Council, the NDRC, and MoR in these plans, but
did not know the details of the Beijing-Shanghai HSR decision-making process. Nearly 14% and 28% of
the residents considered the decision-making on the Beijing-Shanghai HSR as “completely closed” and
“closed”, respectively. Only 5% of the residents perceived it a fully transparent process. According to
China's 2003 EIA Law, construction projects of this size must seek the opinions of relevant entities,
experts and the general public by organizing demonstration meetings, hearings or by any other
means. About one third of the residents knew of the Beijing-Shanghai HSR EIA and 18% of our
respondents participated in it. Over half of the respondents (54%) had no idea how environmental
risks of high-speed railways were managed, and 40% of them had limited knowledge on HSR risk
management. Hence, only 6% of them had a clear idea of HSR environmental risk management.
Effective communication could avoid (environmental) conﬂicts between different stakeholders.
About 9% and 6% of the respondents considered the communication between the local government
and the public, and between railway companies and the public as sufﬁcient, respectively (Table 2).
Almost half of the respondents did not experience any communication from the key stakeholders
regarding HSR construction. Most respondents indicated that, if given the opportunity, they would
“certainly” (27%) and “possible” (58%) express their opinions to the local governments and related
company sectors on the HSR construction and operation. The channels they preferred to use for
expressing their opinions included Internet fora and micro-blogs (22%), petitions to governmental
agencies (20%), conventional media such as television, radio and newspapers (20%), complaints with
friends and family (13%), and violent protest (4%). Over 21% of the respondents considered any
communication on their opinions with governmental agencies and companies “useless”.
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Fig. 8. Public trust in the different organizations on environmental risk management of high-speed railway (the horizontal axis
provides the cumulative percentage of the four trust categories).
Table 2
Communication among the local government, companies and public on environmental risks of the Beijing-Shanghai high-
speed railway (N¼828).
Local government and public Companies and public
No communication at all 42% 49%
Little communication 49% 45%
Sufﬁcient communication 9% 6%
Table 3
Proposed suggestions on risk communication between government and public (N¼696).
Suggestions on risk communication Percent (%)
Disclose information in various ways, especially via new media such as Internet, mobile phone, etc. 29
Implement effectively the speciﬁc information regulations such as Governmental Information Disclosure Statute
and Environmental Information Disclosure Decree
23
Apply a two-way communication model 22
Increase the stakeholders' knowledge and awareness 11
Implement the ofﬁcial spokesman system 8
Build communication platforms 7
G. He et al. / Environmental Development 14 (2015) 37–52 49The main suggestions proposed by the respondents on improving environmental risk commu-
nication of the HSR are summarized in Table 3. Further information disclosure of governments and
related agencies was mentioned most often (29%), followed by effective implementation of speciﬁc
information regulations such as Governmental Information Disclosure Statute and Environmental
Information Disclosure Decree (23%) and a stronger emphasis on two-way communication rather than
one-way information provision. In addition, respondents showed major concerns about the speed of
HSR construction, as half of the respondents (48%) believed that HSR development and construction
should slow down and refocus on quality. In contrast, 19% favoured an accelerated development of
HSR and 8% a moratorium on further development. Spearman correlations analyses indicated that
respondents with a lower income (r¼0.082, po0.05), living in large cities (r¼0.091, po0.05),
G. He et al. / Environmental Development 14 (2015) 37–5250living far away from the HSR track (r¼0.078, po0.05) and with lower risk perception on the HSR
(r¼0.088, po0.05) were more supportive to a fast development of the HSR. Respondents' gender,
age, level of education, profession, and party membership showed no signiﬁcant differences in their
support for the pace of the HSR development.9. Conclusions
The rapid pace of the development and construction of high-speed railway projects are both a
consequence of and a vehicle for China's accelerated development. High-speed railway has become
the preferred medium distance (about 1000 km and less than 5 h traveling) traveling mode for most
residents in this case, because of its speed, comfort and convenience. Hence, even along the HSR
tracks more residents supported the construction of HSR than opposed it. Local government ofﬁcials
as well as residents along the HSR track judged that the beneﬁts of HSR outweighed the
(environmental and social) risks. Also, compared to nuclear and chemical risks, high-speed railway
projects were perceived as low risk infrastructure projects. Environmental impacts of HSR were
considered both as a beneﬁt and as a negative environmental side-effect. If the Chinese have
environmental reservations, these are rather directed at the impacts during operation and less so
regarding the ecological impacts of construction. In that sense, the perceived environmental risk
proﬁle of HSR in China seemed to differ from environmental concerns in western countries. This
explained the high acceptance of HSR in China.
But Chinese residents along HSR routes were quite critical on the information provisioning on and
their participation in HSR decision-making. Decision-making on HSR was dominated by national
governmental agencies (especially the State Council, NDRC, and the previous MoR). Local
governments were promoters of HSR projects, but played hardly a role in decision-making and
information dissemination. And the public had no corresponding voice and was hardly informed and
involved in HSR developments, regardless the participation provisions of the EIA Law. Given this and
the fact that high-level Chinese ofﬁcials interpreted lack of trust in local government as one of the key
problems of contemporary China (He et al., 2012a), it was still remarkable that the public placed high
trust in the central government. Obviously, in a situation of restricted information on environmental
and health impacts of HSR, Chinese citizens tended to rely on the central government as the most
trustworthy source. Chinese citizens had similar low levels of trust in HSR construction and railway
companies as the public in OECD countries.
An increasingly vocal civil society in contemporary China will have consequences for future
environmental information disclosure, communication and participation of residents along newly
planned and developed HSR lines. With more room for protest, discontent and media reporting, low
levels of trust and credibility can have major consequences for smooth implementation of HSR lines.
Experiences in Europe and North America showed that more transparency, communication, dialog
and participation (also engaging regional and national organized NGOs who often had an interest in
HSR) from the early start of HSR development helped in organizing the public debate and bringing
(environmental) concerns into the planning and decision-making process, while at the same time
building trust and preventing violent protests later. This is not only important for the future of
infrastructure development but also for future environmental governance writ large in modern China.Acknowledgment
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